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Statement of Jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter as this case was poured over
from the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)O).

Issues Presented For Review
The issues presented for review are as follows:

1.

Appellants Scott M. Brand and April G. Brand's (the "Brands") first three

purported "issues for review" actually boil down to a single· issue: whether the trial court
correctly granted summary judgment to Appellee the Amy Paul Trust ("Paul"), thereby
~

quieting title of the Subject Property (as defined below) in Paul. "In deciding whether
summary judgment was appropriate, [this Court] need review only whether the trial court
erred in applying the relevant law and whether a material fact was in dispute." Snyder v.

Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, ,r 16, 73 P.3d 325. Given that the trial court's summary
judgment ruling depended upon its interpretation and construction of unambiguous deeds,
the question is a legal one, reviewed for correctness. See Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d
653, 656 (Utah 1979).
2.

Whether the trial court erred when it denied Brands' motion to amend their

complaint on grounds of mootness and futility. This is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

See Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992); Coro/es v. Sabey, 2003

UT App 339, il 16, 79 P.3<l 974.
3.
~

Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Paul's remaining claims-those

neither resolved nor mooted by the summary judgment ruling-without prejudice, where
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the dismissal was based solely upon Paul's stipulation voluntarily to dismiss them. This
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Coro/es, 2003 UT App 339, ,r 47.
4.

Whether Brands have standing to pursue a quiet title action or this appeal as

the quitclaim deed they rely upon came from a grantor who has not been shown to have
any interest in the subject property. Resolution of this issue depends upon interpretation
and construction of unambiguous deeds, making the question a legal one, reviewed for
correctness. See Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979).
Statement of the Case

The following statement is provided pursuant to Rules 24(b) and 24(a)(7).
Nature of the Case

This case is a "boundary dispute" between adjoining land owners with contiguous
backyards. Since prior to 1950, an historic "field fence" has demarked the boundary
between Paul's yard to the south of the "field fence" and the Brands' yard to the north of
it. 1 Since at least the early l 950s, the strip of land in dispute, i.e., the Subject Property
(as defined below), has been enclosed within and treated as part of Paul's yard.
In or about early November 2014, without the approval or consent of Paul, the
Brands wrongfully entered Paul's yard and began tearing down the historic "field fence."
The Brands also removed and destroyed telecommunication cables. Paul immediately
contacted the police, who warned the Brands to stop trespassing and destroying Paul's

As reflected on the Survey, dated December 19, 2014, the "field fence" (identified
as "EXIST. FENCE" on the Survey) sits on the quarter section line. Add Ex. A; R. 637,
896.
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property. Paul also placed no trespassing signs in the area where parts of the "field
fence" had been torn down, and issued a written "cease and desist" demand.
In early January 2015, Paul filed a lawsuit. against the Brands to preserve the status
quo, and to protect her prope1ty. Her complaint asse1ted claims for quiet title, adverse
possession, boundary by acquiescence, declaratory judgment and other claims in the
alternative. Unbeknownst to Paul, the Brands had filed their own quiet title lawsuit a few
days earlier. The Brands' complaint relied entirely upon the false premise-which they
now have conceded to be completely wrong - that the Subject Property was held by their
(1'

predecessors-in-interest and should have passed to them along with title to the rest of
their lot. Upon Paul's motion, the two related lawsuits were consolidated into a single
action, which eventually was resolved by summary judgment in favor of Paul.
At the time the two competing complaints were filed, the strip of land in dispute,
i.e., the Subject Property, was legally titled in Shaw, Inc. -the corporation that had
developed Paul's subdivision in the early 1950s. In June 2015, Paul obtained legal title
to the Subject Property via deeds executed by Shaw, Inc. Paul thereby obtained "record
marketable title" in an unbroken chain tracing back to at least 1911.
In the early 1900s Mary Judge had a farm. Her farm occupied the northern half

and a big part of the southern half of the southea5t quarter of section 15, of Township 2
South, Range 1 East. It is undisputed that the northern boundary of her farm wa5 the¼
section line. The separate "Walker Farm" was north of the ¼ section line, including what
~

is now the Brands' property.
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After Mary Judge died, her fann was distributed to her five children: Frances H.
Woodward; Mary Agnes Baldwin; Elizabeth O'Brien; Frank Judge; and Kathryn T.
Judge (the "Heirs of Mary Judge"). In 1911, the Heirs of Mary Judge split the farm
amongst themselves by simultaneously executing five deeds - one to each of the five
siblings. Frances Woodward received the northeast portion of the Judge Farm, which
included the Paul Property (as defined below) and the Subject Property. Mary Agnes
Baldwin received the northwest portion.
In or about 1949, Francis Woodward deeded substantially all of her property,
including the Paul Property and the Subject Property, to Shaw, Inc. When Shaw, Inc.
platted the Cottonwood Acres No. 2 Subdivision, the Subject Property was omitted. It is
unknown why the Subject Property was omitted from the plat, although power lines and
an irrigation ditch now run through that portion of Paul's yard. This omission was
corrected in June 2015 when Shaw, Inc. deeded the Subject Property to Paul.
Although the Brands have no legitimate claim to the Subject Property, which was
never part of their yard, they have filed this appeal in a continuing and persistent attempt
to "hijack" a large swath of Paul's backyard. The appeal, however, lacks merit. The trial
court's judgment should be affirmed

Course ofProceedings and Disposition Below
In December 2015, Paul moved for summary judgment on her claims for quiet title
and declaratory relief. The Brands opposed the motion. After hearing extensive oral
argument on January 26, 2016, the Court issued a ten-page memorandum decision
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granting summary judgment to Paul. 2 Although both sides offered declarations from title
"experts," the Court was not swayed by the experts' attempted legal interpretations of the
unambiguous deeds. 3 Rather, the Court's decision relied entirely upon its own
interpretation of the recorded deeds and the undisputed surveys.
On February 19, 2016, the Court denied the Brands' motion to amend their
complaint as moot in light of the ruling announced in the memorandum decision.
On March 2, 2016, the Court entered its final Judgment. The Court resolved and
granted Paul's principal claims for quiet title and declaratory relief. The Judgment
~

rendered moot Paul's claims in the alternative for adverse possession, boundary by
acquiescence, boundary by estoppel, boundary by agreement, prescriptive easement and
express easement. The Judgment also dismissed without prejudice Paul's remaining
claims for trespass, conversion, damage to property and slander of title, which Paul
previously had agreed to dismiss voluntarily if summary judgment was granted.

Statement of the Relevant Facts
The central issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred when it granted Paul's
motion for summary judgment. The following facts are those that were undisputed for
purposes of summary judgment. Some the Brands expressly admitted. Others, the
Ilrands failed to "dispute" with admissible evidence:

2

A copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached to this brief as Addendum
Exhibit A.
3
As the Court noted in the Memorandum Decision: "The title experts hired by both
parties do not disagree as to the deeds and other recorded documents which govern the
chain oftitle as to the Subject Property. The parties also agree the properties owned by
Scott M. Brand and Amy S. Paul never had a common owner." Add. Ex. A; R. 888.
{00290941.DOCX / 7}
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At the time of her death on November 8, 1909, Mary Judge owned a farm

1.

occupying the north½ of the southeast quarter of Section 15, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, of the Salt Lake Base & Meridian (and the west 96 rods of the south ½ of the
southeast quarter of Section 15, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base &
Meridian) (the "Judge Farm"). R. 617, 819-820.
2.

Since the Judge Farm occupied the north½ of the southeast quarter of

Section 15, the northern boundary of the Judge Farm was the¼ section line extending
westerly from the quarter section comer between Sections 14 and 15 of Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. R. 617-618.
3.

Both the Subject Property and the Paul Property were once part of the

Judge Farm. R. 614-619, 626-630, 819-829.
4.

After Mary Judge died, her farm was conveyed to her heirs. A decree was

entered on January 28, 1911 granting the farm to her five children as tenants in common:
Elizabeth F. O'Brien; Mary Agnes Baldwin; Kathryn T. Judge; J. Frank Judge; and
Frances H. Woodward (the "Heirs of Mary Judge"). R. 616, 626-630, 819-825.
5.

A couple of months later, the five siblings divided the farm amongst

themselves. R. 616, 626-630, 819-827. 4
6.

Both the Subject Property and the Paul Property were part of the property

deededtoFrancesH. Woodward on March 13, 1911. R. 616, 626-630, 819-827. 5

4

The division of the Judge Farm among her five children is illustrated by the
undisputed historic survey map that was part of the record for purposes of summary
judgment. Add. Ex. A; R. 903, 1185.
{00290941.DOCX / 7}
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7.

Both the Subject Property and the Paul Property were later conveyed by

Frances H. Woodward to Shaw, Inc. on February 4, 1949.

Both the Subject Property and the Paul Property were owned by Shaw, Inc.

8.
Gj

R. 616, 626-630, 819-829. 6

on April 7, 1950, when Shaw, Inc. platted a residential subdivision (Cottonwood Acres
No.2) out of some, but not all of the property it received from Frances H. Woodward. R.

616, 626-630, 819-829.
9.

The Subject Property was not included in Cottonwood Acres No. 2, but

legal title continued to be held in Shaw, Inc. until it was transferred to Paul in June of
(JP

2015. R. 616, 626-630, 819-835.
10.

The Paul Property is Lot 21 of Cottonwood Acres No. 2. Paul's title is

traced through intervening land owners back to Shaw, Inc. R. 616, 626-630, 819-835.
(j£9

11.

The Subject Property is not and never has been part of the Brand Property.

(See, Moore Deel. par. 12, Exs. B, C & D). R. 616-617, 1142.
12.

Neither Brands nor their predecessors have ever been in the chain of title

for the Subject Property. R. 616-617, 1142.
13.

On June 10, 2015, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in its capacities as personal

representatives of the estates of Manford A. Shaw and June W. Shaw, and as trustees of
the June W. Shaw Marital Trust and the Manford A. Shaw Family Trust, executed on
behalf of Shaw, Inc., as grantor, a Quit-Claim Deed transferring and conveying to Paul,

s

A copy of the deed to Francis H. Woodward executed by her four siblings is
attached hereto as Add Ex. A; R. 902.
6
A copy of the deed to Shaw, Inc. executed by Francis H. Woodward is attached
hereto as Add. Ex. A; R. 904.
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~

as Grantee, all of Shaw, Inc. 's right, title and interest in the Subject Property. Said deed
was recorded on June 10, 2015, in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, as Entry
No. 12068498. R. 618, 831-832.
14.

On June 8, 2015, Cynthia Shaw Pitts, the daughter of Manford and June

Shaw, on behalf of all of the children and heirs of Manford and June Shaw, executed on
behalf of Shaw, Inc., as grantor, a Quit-Claim Deed transferring and conveying to Paul,
as Grantee, all of Shaw, Inc.' s right, title and interest in the Subject Property. Said deed
was recorded on June 11, 2015, in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, as Entry
No. 12069013. R. 618, 833-835.
15.

On December 21, 2015, after Paul's Motion for Summary Judgment at

issue in this appeal had been filed, Brands filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended and
Supplemental Complaint generally explaining abandonment of their initial theory and
adoption of a revised theory of the case. R. 658-663.
16.

On January 4, 2016, Paul filed a Limited Opposition to Brands' Motion for

Leave to File Amended and Supplemental Complaint, suggesting that if the Court granted
Paul's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Motion for Leave to File Amended and
Supplemental Complaint would be moot because the assertions underlying Brands'
motion were raised in opposition to Paul's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 853-856.
17.

On February 19, 2016, after deciding the summary judgment issue in favor

of Paul, the trial court denied the Motion for Leave to File Amended and Supplemental
Complaint as moot. R. 943-945.
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18.

On February 5, 2016, Brands filed a motion to dismiss Paul's remaining

counterclaims. The Summary Judgment did not resolve Paul's claims for trespass,
conversion, damage to property and slander of title. R. 905-908.
19.

As Paul advised the Court during oral colloquy, Paul voluntarily was

willing to forego litigation of the remaining claims of trespass, conversion, damage to
property and slander of title if'title to the disputed strip was quieted in Paul, to permit
@

immediate entry of a final judgment. R. 1045.
20.
~

On March 2, 2016, as part of the Judgment, the trial court ordered, "Any

and all other claims and causes of action brought by either party in this matter are
dismissed." The Judgment was silent on the issue of prejudice. R. 1061-1065.

~

Facts Regarding Brands' Lack of Standing
21.

When the Brands filed their Complaint they asserted the Subject Property

was in their chain of title. R. 3-4.
22.

In Brands' Motion for Leave to File Amended and Supplemental

Complaint, and Supporting Memorandum ("Brands' Motion"), Brands conceded the
~

Subject Property was not in their chain of title. R. 659-661.
23.

Paragraph 2 of the Statement of Facts in Brands' Motion states: "At the

time of filing of the initial Complaint, Plaintiff was of the understanding that the property
which is the subject matter of this action, which consists of a strip of land located
between Brands' residential property on the north, defendant Amy S. Paul Trust's
Cav

property on the south ("Subject Property"), was owned by the Estate of John M. Wallace,

{0029094 l .DOCX/ 7}

9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

Jr., and had been inadvertently omitted from Plaintifrs title. See Complaint herein." R.

24.

Paragraph 8 of the Statement of Facts in Brands' Motion states: "Since

filing his Complaint in December 2014, however, Plaintiff Scott M. Brand has

&,;:,1

w

determined that, in fact, title to the Subject Property does not reside in the Estate of John

M. Wallace, Jr., or in Shaw, Inc., but in the heirs of the Estate of Mary Judge by virtue of
(I) a warranty deed dated December 22, 1902, and an order of distribution from the
Estate of Mary Judge entered January 28, 1911." R. 660-661.

25.

Paragraph 9 of the Statement of Pacts in Brands' Motion states: "On

November 4, 2015, Plaintiff and April G. Brand, his wife, received conveyance of a quitclaim deed from Andrew W. Woodward, a direct descendent and heir of Mary Judge,
conveying his right, title and interest in and to the Subject Property to Plaintiff and April

G. Brand." R. 661.
26.

Paragraph 10 of the Statement of Pacts in Brands' Motion states: "On the

basis of this conveyance, Plaintiff and April G. Brand contend that they hold primary
beneficial interest in and to the Subject Property, free and clear of any claim asserted by
the Amy S. Paul Trust or Shaw, Inc." R. 661.
27.

The record, including the evidence submitted relative to the Motion for

Surmnary Judgment, is devoid of any evidence linking title to the Subject Property to this
possible (but not proven) great grandson ofFranccs Woodward.
28.

The record contains no evidence regarding what, if any, interest in the

Subject Property was held by Andrew W. Woodward.
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~

29.

The record contains no evidence regarding what, if any, interest in the

Subject Property was held by the lineal descendants between Francis H. Woodward and
Andrew W. Woodward, the Brands' grantor. There is no evidence concerning whether
those lineal descendants had a will which was probated or died intestate.
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Summary of Arguments

To understand the issues raised on appeal, it is necessary to understand the
geography and history of the disputed strip ofland. The Subject Property lies within
Paul's backyard as enclosed by the historic "field fence" and adjacent to Brands'
~

backyard, but between the legal boundaries of the parties' respective lots. The northern
boundary of the disputed strip is the "¼ section line" which divides the north and south
halves of Section 15, T2S, RIE. Historically, property north of the¼ section line was
part of the Walker Farm, while property south of the¼ section line was the Judge Farm.
Consequently, Paul's property (including the Subject Property) sits south of the¼ section
line, and once was part of the Judge Farm. In contrast, Brands' property sits north of the
¼ section line and was never part of the Judge Farm. When Brands filed their lawsuit,
they did so claiming the disputed strip was in their chain of title. However, they later
abandoned that claim, stating they were misinformed. Rather than abandoning their
meritless claims, however, they simply developed a new argument.
It is undisputed that the strip of land at issue was historically part of the Judge
farm. Mary Judge acquired title to the farm in 1902. She died in 1909 and left the farm
to her five children. In 1911, the five siblings divided the farm amongst themselves, with
two of the siblings receiving the northern portions of the farm. Mary Agnes Baldwin was
granted the northwest portion of the farm, and Frances H. Woodward received the
northeast portion, which includes both the Paul Property and the Subject Property.
Brands claim that, when Mary Judge's children divided the farm five ways
amongst themselves, they intentionally orphaned a strip approximately 23 feet wide
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~

running ½ mile along the entire northern boundary of the farm. Brands claim that now,
Gj

more than 100 years later, that "phantom strip" remains orphaned in lhe five deceased
children of Mary Judge as tenants in common. To reach this conclusion, Brands misread
(and misquote) the 191 I deed to Frances Woodward and make the entirely speculative
assumption that a fence line referenced in a deed recorded 30 years later is the same fonce

line referenced in the 1911 deeds.
The trial court declined to substitute the reading ufBran<ls') expert for its own
interpretation of the 1911 deed. It also declined to indulge Brands by speculating that a
(.j

fence mentioned in a deed in 1941 was the same fence mentioned in the 1911 deeds. In
short, the "opinion" of the Brands' expert failed to raise an issue of fact sufficient to
defeat Paul's Motion for the Summary Judgment.
There was no weighing of conflicting evidence. The experts agreed on which
deeds were in the chain of title for the Subject Property. The Court read and construed
those unambiguous deeds as a matter of law, -concluding that the Subject Property was
included as part of the conveyance to Frances Woodward, meaning it passed to Shaw,
Inc. and then to Paul.
Allowing Brands to amend their complaint would have been futile given the trial
court's ruling quieting title in Paul and the basis for its ruling. The Motion to Amend
properly was denied. Additionally, the dismissal of Paul's other claims without prejudice
was proper given that the claims were not decided on the merits. Paul orally stipulated
that the claims could be dismissed without prejudice if summary judgment was granted
on her principal claims of quiet title and declaratory relief.
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In all respects the trial court was correct and its judgment should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT

I.

Brands Fail to Show That the Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary
Judgment on Paul's Claims for Quiet Title and ~eclaratory Relief.
A.

Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the ~'moving party shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
@

matter oflaw." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a); Mind & Motion UT Investments v. Celtic Bank,
2016 UT 6, ,r 15, 367 P.3d 994. On appeal, the Court's "review is limited to determining
whether the district court correctly applied the summary judgment standard in light of the
undisputed material facts." Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, ,r 10,221 P.3d 219.
B.

Summary Judgment Properly Was Granted to Paul.

The sole question at issue is whether title to the Subject Property properly was quieted
in Paul. There were neither questions of fact as to which deeds made up the chain of title to
Paul, nor as to how Brands received their land. The only question for the trial court was a
legal one, involving the construction and interpretation of the undisputed and unambiguous
deeds. See Hartman v. Potter, 596 P._2d 653,656 (Utah 1979).
In the early l 900s Mary Judge owned a farm which occupied the northern half and
a large part of the southern half of the southeast quarter of section 15, of Township 2
South, Range 1 East. It is undisputed that the northern boundary of her farm was the ¼
section line. After Mary Judge died, her farm was distributed to her five children:
Frances H. Woodward; Mary Agnes Baldwin; Elizabeth O'Brien; Frank Judge; and
Kathryn T. Judge (the "Heirs of Mary Judge"). In 1911, the Heirs of Mary Judge split
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~

the farm amongst themselves. Two of the siblings received the northern pieces. Frances

H. Woodward received the northeast portion, including the Subject Property. Mary

G&J

Agnes Raldwin received the northwest portion.
Paul's legal right to the Subject Property is based on grants of that property from
Woodward's immediate successor-in-interest, Shaw, Inc. Because Paul was the owner of
such property, Paul moved for summary judgment, arguing that title should be quieted in
Paul's favor.
The sole argument made by the Brands was that, based on a speculative
interpretation of a deed recorded some 30 years later (in 1941), the Court should

~

conclude that Woodward did not actually own the Subject Property and, therefore, could
not have deeded it to Paul's grantor. To accept this theory, the trial court not only would
have had to engage in speculation and conjecture, but would be required to assume that
the Heirs of Mary Judge intended to "orphan" a 23-foot wide, 2,418-foot long strip across
the entire northern boundary of the Judge Farm.
The trial court properly rejected Brands' invitation to speculate and impute a
nonsensical interpretation of the 1911 deeds. Instead, the trial court held, based on the
plain language of the unambiguous deeds and other undisputed evidence, that the Heirs of
Mary Judge divided all of their mother's property as it was given to them. See Mem
Dec., p. 6. Add. Ex. A; R. 891.
Deed construction, like interpretation of other written agreements, attempts to
ascertain the intent of the parties from the language of the deed. "[T]he main object in

~

construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties, especially that of the grantor,
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from the language used." Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d at 656. "It is the court's duty to
construe a deed as it is written, and in the final analysis, each instrument must be
construed in the light of its own language and peculiar facts." Id. See also Keith v.

A-fountain Resorts Development, 2014 UT 32, ,I 21, 337 P.3d 213 (same). Further, in
interpreting deeds, the courts should avoid illogical and nonsensical interpretations. See

Red Cliffl,· Corner, LLC v. JJ Hunan, Inc., 2009 UT App 240, ,I 26, 219 P.3d 619.
The trial court engaged in such an analysis when it ruled, according to the
undisputed and unambiguous deeds in Paul's chain of title, that the Heirs of Mary Judge
~

obtained all land owned by their mother, and that their intent was to pass on all of this
prope11y to themselves when they divided the prope1ty amongst themselves.
Based on this analysis, Brands' claim is barred by the Marketable Record Title
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-9-1 et seq. (the "Act"). This is because Paul has a
"marketable record title" as defined by the Act. Under the Act, a marketable record title

~

"operates to extinguish such interests and claims, existing prior to the effective date of
the root of title." Utah Code Ann. § 57-9-8(1). In this case, Paul's "root of title" is the
deed from Frances Woodward to Shaw, Inc. recorded February 4, 1949.
"The general purpose of marketable record title statutes and similar enactments is
to clear titles of record from the clouds, encumbrances, conditions, or limitations of old
and perhaps abandoned or to-be-abandoned instruments or claims, and possible or
ostensible interests or rights, or those of dubious value or validity." See Construction and

<@

Effect of "Marketable Record Title,, Statutes, 31 A.LR.4th 11. Marketable Record Title
Statutes achieve this goal by barring claims of interest based on records pre-dating the
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statutorily defined "root of title." Legislatures vary on how old the root of title must
be. In Utah it is 40 years. Utah Code Ann.§ 57-9-1.
When a person has marketable record title, "all such interests, claims, or charges,
however denominated, whether legal or equitable, present or future, whether the interests,
claims, or charges are asserted by a person sui juris or under a disability, whether the
person is within or without the state, whether the person is natural or corporate, or is
private or governmental, are declared to be void." Utah Code Ann.§ 57-9-3.

~

In the instant case, there is no competent evidence which controverts that Paul has
marketable record title to the Subject Property. Her title stems from the root of the deed
from Frances Woodward to Shaw, Inc., which was recorded on February 4, 1949, well
over 40 years ago. There are no interests of record appearing between the time Shaw,
Inc. took title and when it conveyed title to the Subject Property to Paul. Any purported
interest stemming from a recorded document predating the 1949 deed from Woodward to
Shaw, Inc. is void.
Brands argue that this analysis was error because the trial court ignored Brands'
"expe1t opinion." Brands' title expe1t purp01ted to opine that the Heirs of Mary Judge
did not disperse all of their mother's property, but instead omitted the 23-foot wide,
2,418-foot long "phantom strip" when they divided the farm five ways. The Brands'
argument requires the Court to speculate that a fence line referenced thirty years later, in
a 1941 deed involving a different parcel of land which did not include the Subject
Property, was the same fence referred to in the deed to Woodward - and therefore the
Subject Property was not a part of the conveyance to Woodward.
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There are many problems with this theory, but two stand out: (1) it is based on
speculation; and (2) it is contrary to the undisputed evidence before the trial court.
The 1941 Deed does not even suggest that the fcncc it references is the fence line
dividing the Walker and Judge Farms. Further, there is no logical or evi_dentiary basis to
make this speculative assumption. The "opinion" of the Brands' "expert" that the 1941
deed references the same fence is bald speculation. As such, it was insuflicient to defeat
Paul's Motion for Summary Judgment.

An affidavit "is simply a method of placing evidence of fact before the court."
~

Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, ,I 20, 136 P.3d 1252. Thus, "[a]ffidavits
submitted in support or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be based
on the personal knowledge of the affiant and may not be considered by the trial court if
largely based on unsubstantiated opinions, conjecture, and beliefs." Id. Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) specifically requires as much. Affidavits that do not meet the
standards of rule 56(c) are inadmissible. See Golden Meadows Properties, LC v. Strand,
2010 UT App 257, iJ 13,241 P.3d 37; Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah
1983) ("[S]tatements in [an] affidavit [that] are largely conclusory ... would not be
admissible in evidence and may not be considered on summary judgment").
In addition, Brands' argument is belied by numerous sources of credible,
admissible evidence. First, the 1911 deeds to Francis I-1. Woodward and Mary Agnes
Baldwin (and the 3 deeds to the other siblings) unequivocally show that Mary Judge's
children divided the entire farm between themselves - five ways. There is no credible,
admissible evidence that they intentionally created a 23-foot wide, 2,418-foot long
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"phantom strip'' that would be orphaned in tenancy in common status for any period of
time, let alone the next 100-plus years. Rather, the only logical interpretation of the
unambiguous deeds is that the Subject Property was part of the property conveyed to
Woodward. Woodward then conveyed it to Shaw, Inc. using a legal description
subst.antia.lly identical to the one in the deed executed by her four siblings. Shaw, Inc.
recently conveyed the Subject Property to Paul.
Brands' argument also ignores a contemporaneous deed issued by the heirs of
Mary Judge to Mary Agnes Baldwin. The 1911 deed to Mary Agnes Baldwin explicitly
states that "the fence dividing the Walker and Judge farms" is located "on the South line
of the Walker farm and the center of sec[tion] 15." The center line of Section 15 is "the
¼ section line." The deed states:
Beginning at a point on the fence line dividing the Judge and Walker
Farms, 1548.96 ft, more or less westerly from the¼ sec. cor., between secs.
14 and 15, T. 2 S., R. 1 E., S.L.B & M, and running thence Southerly 507.0
ft., more or less, thence Westerly 257 .5 ft., more or less, thence Southerly
863.8 ft., more or less, thence Westerly l 033.9 ft., more or less, to the
westerly fence of the Judge farm, thence Northerly, 427.9 ft., more or less,
thence Westerly 24.7 ft., more or less, thence Northerly along the westerly
fence of the Judge farm, 943.9 ft., more or less, to the north west cor. of the
Judge farm, being on the South line of the Walker farm and the center

of sec. 15, T. 2 S., R. 1 E., thence Easterly, 1316.1 ft., more or less,
along the fence dividing the Walker and Judge Farms, to the place of
beginning, including an area of 36.079 acres.
A copy of the deed to Mary Agnes Baldwin executed by her four siblings is attached
hereto as Add. Ex. B; R. 818.

{00290941 .DOCX/ 7}

20

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

In 1911, the fence line sat on the¼ section line. No strip was orphaned. Both the
1911 deed to Mary Agnes Baldwin and the 1911 deed to Frances Woodward conveyed
land extending to the northern boundary of the Judge Farm, i.e., to the¼ section line.
Once the experts of both parties agreed on the deeds in the chain of title, no further
expert testimony was necessary or relied upon by the Court. It did not adopt the
"opinion" of Paul's title expert. Rather, the Court construed the unambiguous deeds
itself.
In addition to the five 1911 deeds in which the children of Mary Judge divided her

c,

farm, a historical survey also shows that the northern boundary of the property conveyed

by the heirs of Mary Judge to Frances Woodward in 1911 was the ¼ section line. Add.
Ex. A; R. 903, 1185. As confirmed by the undisputed historical survey and as stated in the
above-quoted deed, in 1911, "the fence dividing the Walker and Judge Farms" ran
westerly through the center of the section, along what is referred to as the ¼ section line.

Add Ex. A; R. 891 and 818.
The undisputed evidence before the trial court conclusively demonstrated that the
Subject Property was part of the Mary Judge Farm. The entire farm was conveyed to
Mary Judge's five children. The siblings then conveyed the northeast part of the fann,
including the Subject Property, to Frances H. Woodward. Woodward conveyed all of the
property conveyed to her (excepting only a single acre which did not include the Subject
Property) to Shaw, Inc. Shaw, Inc. deeded the Subject Property to Paul. The trial court
@

properly granted summary judgment in Paul's favor.
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The trial court's interpretation of the unambiguous deeds is correct as a matter of
law. Further, Brands failed to come forward with admissible, non-parol evidence

iJ

sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact. As such, the decision should be affirmed.

C.

Brands' "Point Il" Was Not Sufficiently Raised Below. Additionally, Brands
Failed to Raise a Genuine Issue of Fact
Brands argue that summary judgment was improperly granted due to

certain alleged infirmities in the deeds presented by Paul. This argument was not
sufficiently presented below and fails in any event, per application of Utah Code section
57-4(a)-4. Additionally, Brands appear to misunderstand the import of the deeds, and
have not raised a genuine issue of fact.

1.

Brands Did Not Preserve the Issue for Appeal

An argument not presented below may not be considered on appeal. See Gowe v.

Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2015 UT App 105, 17,356 P. 3d 683 (''we generally do
not address unpreserved arguments raised for the first time on appeal"). "In order to
preserve an issue for appeal, it ... must be specifically raised such that the issue is
sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court, and must be
supported by evidence or relevant legal authority." State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, 18,
86 P.3d 759. "Merely mentioning an issue does not preserve it; the issue must be
specifically raised, with relevant legal authority, in a manner that alerts the court to the
need to correct the error." Brady v. Park, 2013 UT App 97,138, 302 P.3d 1220, cert.

denied:,. 308 P.3d 536. See also Carlsen v. Board ofAdjustment of City ofSmithfield,
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Gi;..,

2012 Utah App 260, if19, 12,287 P.3d 440 ("more complex legal argument" on appeal
not brought to lower tribw1al's attention were not preserved).

In its memorandum opposing Paul's motion for summary judgment, Brands did
not assert "Point II" as a basis for denying summary judgment. Instead, Paul only
mentioned cursory objections on the basis of Utah Code section 25-5-1 (without further
explanation) and generally refened to "Rule 801-802" in its response to fact nos. 24 and
25. These arguments were not further developed nor made a part of Brands' argument.
Absent a showing that a factual dispute was brought to the trial court's attention, through
(@

a proper evidentiary showing that directly counters the factual allegations set forth by the
moving party, an appellant is "barred from raising this issue on appeal because it was not
argued below." Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 11, 115, 155 P.3d 900.

~

2.

Brands' "Objections" to the Deeds Are Insufficient to Defeat

Summary Judgment
The Brands improperly argue that the deeds from Shaw, Inc. to Paul are deficient
because there was no evidence before the trial court that Cynthia Shaw Pitts or Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (in its capacities as trustee and personal representative for Manford
Shaw and June Shaw) held title. In making this argument, the Brands set up a straw man
so they can knock it down.
The deeds were made by Shaw, Inc., a dissolved Utah corporation. The deeds
were not made by Cynthia Shaw Pitts or Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Under Utah law, "[a]
dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence ... [as] appropriate to wind up and
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liquidate its business and affairs, including ... disposing of its properties that will not be
distributed in kind to its shareholders .... " Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405(l){b).
The deeds were signed on behalf of Shaw, Inc. by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (in its
capacities as trustee and personal representative for Manford Shaw and June Shaw) and
Cynthia Shaw Pitts (on behalf of all heirs of Manford Shaw and June Shaw).
Under Utah law, these deeds were, and are, presumed to have been properly and
duly executed by Shaw, Inc. The dispositive statute provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title
to the real property affected:
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person
purporting to execute it;
(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf it
is executed are the persons they purport to be ...
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or
described by the document acted in good faith at all relevant times;
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer
of an organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity:
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope
of his authority; ... and
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he
acted for a principal who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any
relevant time ... ; and
G) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including without
limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of
organizations, are true.
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-4a-4(1).
Brands provide no contrary legal authority. Further, the Brands utterly failed to adduce
any admissible evidence sufficient to challenge the validity of the deeds or the statutory
presumption that they were duly executed. Accordingly, Brands failed to raise an issue of fact
that could defeat swnmary judgment, even if it had been preserved for appeal.
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D.

The Trial Court Did Not Weigh Evidence.

Without offering any concrete examples, Brands argue that the trial court "impennissibly
weighed" the evidence in granting summary judgment to Paul. This argument is without merit.
As set forth above, Brands did not produce any admissible evidence to ''weigh" on the

sole issue in contention, to wit, whether the land conveyed to Woodward (and thence to Shaw,
Inc.) included the Subject Property. Further, even if admissible, Brands' "evidence" fails to
prove what they claim it does.
Remarkably, Brands argue in their brief that "[n]owhere in that quit-claim deed
@

[the 1911 deed to Frances Woodward], however, does the description of the property
conveyed make any call to the section line upon which the lower court relied."
(Appellant's Brief at 32-33). Then, Brands misquote the deed, omitting the very
reference they claim is missing:

G:p

"221.3 feet westerly from the section line between sections 14 and 15, T2S,
RlE, SLB&M, at a point on the fence line dividing the Walker and Judge
farms ... ".
(Appellant's Brief at 33.) The deed actually states:
"221.3 ft. westerly from the 1/4 section cor[ner] between Secs 14 and 15,
T2S, RlE, SLB&M, at a point on the fence line dividing the Walker and
Judge farms ... " Add. Ex. A; R. 902 (emphasis supplied).
Brands are simply wrong. By referencing the ¼ section comer, the deed absolutely
references the beginning point of the section line upon which the trial court relied.
The trial court's decision involved the inteipretation of deeds, a question of law for the

~

court to decide. The fact that Paul's expert asserted that the meaning of a grant was different
does not create an issue of fact, but merely evidences an irrelevant legal conclusion. See, e.g.,
{00290941.DOCX / 7}

25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487,493 (Utah App. 1992) (experts do not provide legal

opinions); First Sec. Bank v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P. 2d 1253, 1258 (Utah 1989) (legal
duty owed by trust deed trustee is question of law to be determined by the court, and not
question of fact suitable for testimony by expert in real estate law); Davidson v. Prince,
813 P. 2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App. 1991) ("exclusion of [testimony] can be affirmed on the
ground that it was a legal conclusion.").
Brands asked the Court to conclude that the use of the term "westerly" in the
Woodward deed meant the fence line could not sit on the ¼ section line. Brands argued
that the surveyor creating the legal description would not call to a point that was
"westerly" if that point was on the ¼ section line. Brands assert that the call would be to
due west. However, Brands ignore and fail to recognize that the section lines in that part
of Salt Lake County do not run precisely east to west. The surveys which are part of the
summary judgment record show the section lines do not run "due west" or "true west,"
but some fractions of a degree off. R. 636-642. If the call was to a point "due west," that
point would not lie on the ¼ section line.
Brands' argument actually confirms that the trial court's reading of the subject
~

deeds were in all ways correct. To read the legal descriptions as Brands suggest would
create gaps where there are none. Brands' proffered "opinions" do not raise genuine
issues of fact. A wrong fact, is not a fa.ct. Further, only admissible evidence can create a
genuine issue of fact. Brands' argument that the trial court erred by weighing testimony
without cross examination or rebuttal evidence similarly lacks merit. First, Brands did
not object. As such, the issue has not been preserved for appeal. Not only did Brands
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fail to object, they heartily embraced the procedure and used their expert in conjunction
with a slide presentation to the trial court. Having gambled on the result, Brands cannot
be heard to complain that the tactics they employed were procedurally improper when
they failed to achieve the desired result. Brands' conduct and failure to object constitute

a waiver of the claimed error.
Moreover, when Brands' expert was being sworn, the trial court explained, "We're
going to swear you in first ... so the evidence is - can be accepted by the court if it
chooses to do so." R. 1152. The Memorandum Decision issued by the Court makes it
@

clear the court did not accept the opinions of either parties' title experts, except to
identify the deeds in the chain of title. Tt did not consider the oral testimony. The
citations provided by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision demonstrate it solely
relied upon the deeds and surveys to support its determination. R. 886-904.
Additionally, afler Paul (lhe only moving party) filed a reply memorandum with a
supplemental declaration from its expert, Brands improperly submitted another
declaration outside the rules of civil procedure in an attempt to rebut the opinions of
Paul's expert. Brands' claim that there was no opportunity for rebuttal evidence is
contrary to the record before the Court, R. 867-876, and similarly without merit. The
argument is specious because Brands' counsel admitted to the trial court that Brands had
- no other evidence which could be offered at trial concerning the Subject Property. R.

1160-61.
Brands' flawed arguments fail to provide a basis for reversal.
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II.

Brands Fail to Show Abuse of Discretion Regarding the Trial Court's Denial
of Their Motion to Amend.
Brands argue that the trial court erred when it denied their motion to amend as

moot. Brands do not argue that the trial court's decision on this point was error given its
ruling on Paul's motion for summary judgment. Instead, Brands argue that, because the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment, it erred in denying the motion to amend.
Although leave to amend is "freely given when justice so requires," Utah R. Civ.
P. 15(a), justice does not require that leave be given if doing so would be futile. See

Hudgens v. Prosper, Inc., 3020 UT 68, ,r 15,243 P.3d 1275; see also Anda/ex Res., Inc.
v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (leave to amend should not be given
if newly asserted claim is legally insufficient or futile). Here, Brands' proposed
amendment would not have survived a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the amendment
properly was denied.
This Court can, and should, affirm the trial court on the alternative basis that a
party is not entitled to amend its complaint to avoid losing a motion for summary
judgment. See Tretheway v. Furstenau, 2001 UT App 400, ,r 17, 40 P.3d 649 (motion to
amend is untimely if filed after district court granted summary judgment adverse to
movant); Atcitty v. Board ofEduc., 967 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (same).
For each of these reasons, the trial court properly denied Brand's motion to
amend, and certainly did not abuse its discretion.
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III.

Dismissal Without Prejudice of Paul's Remaining Claims was Not an Abuse
of Discretion.
Brands ask for relief that cannot be granted. Brands argue: "[i]fthe Court sees fit

to affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the quiet title question, dismissal
of the Paul Trust's rnmaining claims should have been with prejudice." AJ)!). Rr.:i J). 44.
As Brands concede, the only manner by which the trial courL could have granted
@

dismissal of the un-litigated claims was without prejudice, per Utah Rule of Civil
Proceure 4 l(a)(2)(ii). Paul advised the trial court during oral colloquy that, if summary
judgment was granted on Paul's principal claims for quiet title and declaratory relief,
Paul voluntarily would forego litigation of the remaining claims of trespass, conversion,
damage to property and slander of title to permit immediate entry of a final judgment.

@

The only basis for dismissal was Paul's own voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
Brands provide no basis for this Court to render the ruling it seeks, other than to
find, for the first time on appeal, that Paul's additional claims fail on their merits. This
argument was not made below and was not preserved for appeal. See State v. Richins,
2004 UT App 36,

1 8, 86 P.3d 759.

Further, this Court does not make factual findings.

See Merrick Young Inc. v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, 2011 UT App 164,134,
257 P.3d 1031 (rejecting a party's request that the Court of Appeals make factual
@

findings).
Accordingly, Brands fail to show that the trial court abused its discretion or
otherwise erred in its dismissal of the remaining claims without prejudice.
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IV.

The Court Should Affirm the Ruling Below on the Alternative Ground that
the Brands Lack Standing for Quiet Title Purposes, Because They Now
Concede that the Subject Property is Not Within Their Chain of Title.
Brands started the lawsuit claiming that the Sul~ject Prope1iy was in their chain of

title. Their claim was disproven, and the Brands have conceded that the Subject Property
was never in their chain of title.
Rather than conceding they have no colorable claim to title of the Subject
Property, however, Brands changed their theory. 7 Specifically, on or about November 4,
2015, the Brands obtained a quitclaim deed from Andrew Woodward. 8 A fair summary of
Brands' new theory is: ''we obtained a quitclaim deed from someone who may be a
grandson of one of five siblings who once owned the farm which included the Subject
Property- so we own the Subject Property." This quitclaim deed is the only possible
basis for Brands to have standing. The problem is that the grantor under the Brands'
quitclaim deed has not been shown to hold (or even claim) any eolorablc title to the
Subject Property.
A quitclaim deed from someone who has not been shown to be in the chain of title
is legally insufficient to confer standing on the Brands. This is because, even if Andrew
Woodward is who Brands claim him to be - one of several lineal descendants of a
deceased individual that formerly held title - there is no evidence (or even a legally

7

While the Motion for Summary Judgment, which is the subject of this appeal, was
pending, the Brand's moved to amend their Complaint to reflect their new theory,
admitting the Subject Property was never in their chain of title. Ex. 2. The Motion was
denied as moot after the Court granted Paul's Motion for Summary Judgment.
8
Mr. Woodward is purportedly "a direct descendant of Francis H. Judge
Woodward, a named heir under the estate of Mary Judge [great Grandma]."
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cognizable allegation) that he had any interest in the Subject Property. Family lineage
alone is an insufficient basis for a claim of interest. 9 Title could have passed in any

number of ways. There is no evidence in the record to show wheU1er lhe heirs belween
Francis H. Woodward and Andrew Woodward died with wills or intestate. Moreover,
there is no evidence concerning what, if any, real property those heirs owned when they
died. Brands cannot claim even "colorable title."
"Standing to bring a quiet title action to perfect title is limited to parties who could
acquire an interest in the property created by the court's judgment or decree." Elder v.
@

Nephi City, 164 P.3d 1238, 1243 (Utah 2007). When the Brands abandoned their
erroneous claim that the Subject Property was within their chain of title, they gave up
their claim to standing. The quitclaim deed from Andrew Woodward, without more, fails

Ci

to give them standing.
When a party has no right to interest in the subject property, they have no standing
under the quiet title statute. Andrus v. Bagley, 775 P.2d 934, 935 (Utah 1989).
Though old, the case of Campbell v. Union Sav. & Inv. Co., 226 P. 190, 193 (Utah
1924), is controlling. In that case the defendant, a mortgagee, claimed an interest in
property by virtue of a mortgage it obtained from a man named Langlois. The defendant
9

Even if the Court considered that Brands' highly attenuated claim to an interest in
the Subject Property was sufficient under the quiet title statute, Brands cannot get arow1d
the Marketable Record Title Act, which bars claims of interest based on records predating the statutorily defined "root of title." Utah Code Ann. Section 57-9-1. The Act
states: "Any person having the legal capacity to own land in this state, who has an
unbroken chain of title of record to any interest in land for 40 years or more, shall be
deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest .... " Any interest derived from
Francis H. Judge Woodward would pre-date Paul's unbroken chain.of title with its 1949
root.
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failed to allege or prove that Langlois had any interest in the subject property. For this
reason the court could not conclude that the mortgage constituted a lien against the
property. Because the defendant did not prove an interest in the property, the defendant's
assertions against Plaintiffs title, were held improper. The Court stated:
If, therefore, the defendant has shown no right to or interest in the premises,
which it has not, how can it be heard to complain that the court erred in
adjudging plaintiff to be the owner as against the defendant'/ Certainly
plaintifr s title, however defective it may be, is nevertheless ample to
withstand the assaults of the defendant so long as the defendant shows no
right, title or interest whatever in the property.

Campbell v. Union Sav. & Inv. Co., 226 P. 190, 193 (Utah 1924).
In the case at bar, Andrew Woodward is like Langlois in Campbell: an unknown, a
person as likely to be a stranger to title as not, an unproven quantity.
When a party has failed to show any legally cognizable interest the subject

~

property, they cannot contest the title of another party. Brands' concession that the
Subject Property does not fall within their chain of title and their failure to present any
admissible evidence to the court below of any interest on the part of their quitclaim
grantor, demonstrates "that the grounds for review are so insubstantial as not to merit
further proceedings and consideration by the appellate court." Pursuant to Utah R. App.
P. I0(a)(2)(A), appellee Paul respectfully requests that the Court summarily affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
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~

Conclusion
~

Brands fail to meet their burden on appeal. They have not demonstrated any
reversible error committed by the trial court. Accordingly, Paul respectfully requests that

@

this Court affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.
DATED this 7th day of September, 2016.

Matthew M. Boley
William G. Garbina

Attorneys for Appellee

~
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RULE 24(t)(l)(C) CERTIFICATION
T certify that this Brief contains 8,723 words and therefore complies with the

maximum limit of 14,000 words, as required of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule

24(f)(l)(A).
.

......

William G. Garbina
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on this 7th day of September, 2016, I caused to be served two

true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief via hand-delivery to the
following:
Vincent Rampton
JONES WALDO
170 South Main, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit A:

Memorandum Decision (with exhibits)

Exhibit B:

Deed to Mary Agnes Baldwin
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN 29 2016
Salt Lake County -,---{:)

By=------=--1..!2~Deputy Clerk
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE mmn .TIIDTCIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

TM. BRAND, an individual,

CASE NO. 140908751

laintiff,
vs.

THE
decea
Trus
Paul,

Judge Robert P. Faust

ESTATE OF JOHN M. WALLACE,
ed, THE AMY S. PAUL TRUST under
Agreement dated August 30, 2001 {Amy S.
rustee), and JOHN DOES 1-50,

S. PAUL, TRUSTEE of the Amy S. Paul
Trus , a trust organized and legally existing
unde the laws of the State of Utah,
Counterclaimant, Cross-Claimant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.

TM. BRAND, an individual, APRIL G.
, an individual, SCOTT M. BRAND
APRIL G. BRAND, TRUSTEES of the
Bra d Family Trust, SHAW INC., a dissolved
Uta corporation, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10,

Counterclaim Defendants, Cross-Claim
Defendants and Third-Party Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Comt pursuant to a Request to Submit on Amy S.
!i

Paul Trustee's~ Motion for Summary Judgment againsti Scott M. Brand. The Court heard oral argument
·1
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unsel on January 26, 2016 and took the matter under advisement. The Court having considered the
and reviewed the pleadings and documents filed, determines as follows:
BACKGROUND

This case is a boundary line dispute between owners of adjoining parcels of land. The land in
runs east-west on the north side of the property line of the parcel/lot deeded to Amy S. Paul,
Trust e, and runs east-west on the south side of the property line of the parcel deeded to Scott M. Brand.
Both parties havt: done ~xltmsive document title research on the property in dispute, going back to

thee ly 1900's which documents is not in dispute.

MOTION
Amy S. Paul, Trustee, seeks summary judgment asserting she owns the property in dispute by
obtained ownership through deeds from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Shaw Inc. Scott M. Brand
oppo es Summary Judgment on the basis that Shaw Inc. never took or held any right, title or interest in
the d sputed property, but ownership remained with the heirs of Mary Judge. Further, Scott M. Brand
asse s he owns the disputed property because he obtained a quit-claim deed from one of the descendanls
of M ry Judge on or about November 4, 2015.

LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary Judgment

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment may be granted:
[i]fthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is nQl genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but the
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response, by affidnvits or HS othernri$;e provided in this rule, must set forth ttp(.:dffo !"~t.:t3
showing that then~ is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment. if appropriate~ shall
be entered against a party failing to tile such a response.

DISCUSSION
The title experts hired by both parties do not disagree as to the deeds and other recorded
docum .nts which govern the chain of title as to the ·suhject Property.

The parties also agree the

prope1 ies owned by Scott M. Brand and Amy S. Paul never had a common owner.
Amy S. Paul, Trustee, is the legal and equitable owner of that certain real property located in Salt
Lake

unty, State of Utah, with an approximate street a~dress of 2591 East Brentwood Drive, Holladay,

Utah 8 121, and more particularly described as follows:

All of Lot 21, Cottonwood Acres No. 2 Subdivision, as found on file in the Office
of the Salt Lake County Recorder, in Book K, at p_age 97.
I

(the "P ul Property"). (See, Ex. 1, Declaration of David Moore, para. 6 ("Moore Deel.")).
Scott M. Brand and April G. Brand, as trustees of the Brand Family Trust (the "Brands''), are the
owners of record of property located at or about 2594 Walker Lane, Holladay, Utah 84121 (the "Brand
Prope

"). (See, Moore Deel. para. 14).
Immediately to the north of the Paul Property, sits the "Subject or Disputed" property, currently

identifi d. on the records of Salt Lake County as Tax Parcel No. 22-15-401-021 and legally described as
follows
Beginning at a point on the section line, said point being South 89°39'23" West
61 S.68 feel along said secliun lin~ from Lh~ East Quarter Comer of Section 15,
Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running:
11

thence South 06°48'40 East 18.08 feet to the Northeast Corner of Lot 21,
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~

Cottonwood Acres No. 2 Subdivision; thence North 89°49'20" West 272.04 feet along the north
line_to the Northwest Comer of said Lot 21, Cottonwood Acres No. 2 Subdivision; thence North
00°47'20" East 15.49 feet to a point on said section line; thence North 89°39'23" East 269.69 feet
along said section line to the point of beginning.
·

(See,

oore Deel. paras. 6 &7; Ex. 2).
The Court has attached hereto as Exhibit I, a copy of a survey showing the location of the Subject

Prope y relative to the Paul Property. The Brand property is immediately to the north of the Subject
Prope

and Scott M. Brand does not dispute his property deed does not contain a description for the land
!

The northern boundary of the Subject or Disputed Property is the ¼ Section line extending
from the quarter section comer between Sections 14 and IS of Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt L

e Base & Meridian. (See, Moore Deel. para. 7).
The Brand Property sits entirely within the northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 2 South,

Range I East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. (See, Moore Deel. para. IS). Both the Subject Property and the
Paul P operty sit entirely within the southeast quarter of Section 15, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt La e Base & Meridian. (See, Moore Deel. para. 13). Thus, Mr. Brand and his predecessors in interest
~

have n ver been in the chain of title for the disputed property.
In order to avoid a lengthy recap of the land ownership from the beginning of the recorded
docum nts, the Court will simply state the parties are in agreement the recorded property deeds showed
the dis uted parcel as having been owned by Mary Judge and was sometimes referred to as the Mary
Judge
A Warranty Deed with Mary Judge as Grantee was recorded on December 22, 1902, as Entry No.
164775. See Exhibit 2 attached.
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At the time of her death on November 8, 1909, Mary Judge owned the n01th ½ of the southeast
quarte of Section 15, Township 2 South, Range I East, of the Salt Lake Base & Meridian (and the west
of the south ½ of the southeast quarter of Section 15, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Meridian). (See, Moore Deel. para. 16). Because Mary Judge owned the north½ of the southeast
of Section 15, the northern boundary of her property was the¼ Section line extending westerly
from t e quarter section corner between Sections 14 and 15 ofTownship 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Meridian. Both the Subject Property and the Paul Property were part of the Mary Judge property
becaus they are located in the north ½ of the southeast quarter of Section 15, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, o the Salt Lake Base & Meridian which she owned,!
On January 28, 1911, Judge T. D. Lewis of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
Division, signed an Order distributing the estate of Mary Judge to her heirs. Thus, both the
Subjec Property and the Paul Property were conveyed by the Estate of Mary Judge to her heirs: Elizabeth
F. 0, rien, Mary Agnes Baldwin, Kathryn T. Judge, J. Frank Judge and Frances H. Woodward (the
"Heirs of Mary Judge"). (See, Moore Deel. para. 17(c)). See Order as Exhibit 3 attached hereto.
~

The

ettling and Distributing the Estate of Mary Judge was recorded on February 1, 1911 as Entry No.
in Book 7-Y of Deeds at page 227 of the Official Records.
The legal description in the Order of Distribution was the N ½SE¼ and the West 96 rods of the
1/4 of Section 15, Township 2 South of Range I East of Salt Lake Meridian, ~hus again the
boundary of the property conveyed by the Estate of Mary Judge to the Heirs of Mary Judge on
Janu

28, 1911, was the ¼ Section line extending we~terly from the quarter section comer between

Section 14 and 15 ofTownship 2 South, Range I East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. The Court notes that
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a fenc line call was not used to describe the northern line of the property when it was distributed to the

The Heirs of Mary Judge executed various deeds to divide the real property in the Estate of Mary
mongst themselves. On March 13, 1911, the Heirs of Mary Judge conveyed the Subject Property
and th Paul Property to Frances H. Woodward. (See, Moore Deel. para. 12, Exs. B & C).

The

descri ion in the deed {perhaps for the first time) makes reference to a fence line dividing the Walker and
roperty (farms) as east west call showing the northern line of the property. Previously, as shown
above, he north property line was established by the N ½ ~E ¼ description in the various deeds.
The Court determines the northern boundary of the property conveyed by the Heirs of Mary
Judge t Frances H. Woodward on March 13, 1911, was the¼ Section line extending westerly from the
quarter section comer between Sections 14 and 15 of Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base &
Meridi n because that is how the heirs received it from their mother's estate and that is what they
distribu ed amongst themselves. (See, Moore Deel. para. 12, Exs. B & C; See also, Ex. 3 County Survey).
The Co rt further notes, this fence line is also referenced in the other deeds by the heirs to themselves
which stablishes this fence line as being along the ¼ Section line. See Deed from the heirs to Mary
aldwin as Grantee, recorded March 15, 1911 as Entry No. 2774 77 in Book 6-K of Deeds at page
S15 in t e Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. This Deed specifically references the south line of the
roperty which is the center of Section 15. The center line of the Section is the ¼ Section line.
i[

urther, the Salt Lake County Plats at the time wH~n the Judge property was divided by the heirs
of Ma

Judge to themselves (including Francis Woodard) shows the northern property line to be the ¼

Section ine. See attached as Exhibit 5.
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On February 4, 1949, both the Subject Property and the Paul Property were conveyed by Frances

H. W odward to Shaw Inc. The northern boundary of the property conveyed by Frances H. Woodward to
c., was caIJed to the fence line between the Walker and Judge property which the Court has
dete

ined to be on the ¼ Section line extending westerly from the quarter section corner between

Sectio s 14 and 15 of Township 2 South, Range I East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. (See, Moore Deel.
para. I , Exs. B & C). See Exhibit 6 attached hereto. It should be noted there is no evidence the Walker
Farm r property ever went beyond the northeast quarter of Section 15, into the southeast quarter of
Sectio 15, Township 2 South, Range I East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. This also implies property line
betwe n the Walker and Judge farms was the¼ Section line.
Once Shaw Inc. owned the property, the creation of the confusion as to the ownership of the
parcel occurred. Both the Subject Property and the Paul Property were owned by Shaw Inc. On

1950, Shaw Inc. platted a residential subdivision (Cottonwood Acres No.2) out of some, but not
all oft e property it received from Frances H. Woodward. (See, Moore Deel. para. 12, Exs. B & C). The
perty is Lot 21 of Cottonwood Acres No. 2 and Paul's chain oftitle is traced through intervening
ers back to Shaw Inc. (See, Moore Deel. para. 12, Exs. B & C). Amy S. Paul, Trustee's, Deed for
her pro erty/lot in Cottonwood Acres No. 2 did not include the Subject Property north of her lot because
the Su ·ect Property was not included in Cottonwood Acres No. 2.

However, legal title to the Subject

remained in Shaw Inc.
As mentioned above, no part of the Subject Property sits within the northeast quarter of Section
1ship 2 South, Range I East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, where the Brand property is located and
the Su ·ect Property is not and never has been part of the Brand Property, and neither Brand nor his
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predec ssors have ever been in the chain of title for the Subject Property. (See, Moore Deel. para. 12, Exs.

On June 10, 2015, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in 'its capacities as personal representatives of the

GtJ

estates of Manford A. Shaw and June W. Shaw, and as trustees of the June W. Shaw Marital Trust and the
Manfo d A. Shaw Family Trust, executed on behalf of Shaw Inc., as grantor, a Quit-Claim Deed
ing and conveying to Paul, as Grantee, all of Shaw lnc.'s right, title and interest in the Subject
Prope

. Said deed was recorded on June I0, 2015, in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, as

On June 8, 2015, Cynthia Shaw Pitts, the daughter of Manford and June Shaw, on behalf of all of
the chil ren and heirs of Manford and June Shaw, executed on behalf of Shaw Inc., as grantor, a QuitClaim

eed transferring and conveying to Paul, as Grantee, all of Shaw Inc. 's right, title and interest in

the Sub ect Property. Said deed was recorded on June 11, 2015, in the office of the Salt Lake County
, as Entry No. 12069013.
etween the time Frances H. Woodward conveyed the Subject Property to Shaw Inc. on February
4, 1949, which is more than 40 years ago, and the time Shaw Inc. conveyed the Subject Property to Paul
on June 10, 2015, no other conveyance or title transaction purports to create an interest in anyone other
than Pau.
he Court determines Amy S. Paul, Trustee, has acquired all right, title and interest in the Subject
jl

Property previously owned or titled in the name of Shaw Irle. and has marketable record title as that term
is define in Utah Code Ann. § 57-9-8(1).
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As to the deed recently obtained from an heir of Francis Woodard, the subject property had
alread been transferred from Woodard to Shaw Inc., aqd therefore, Mrs. Woodard would not have any
the pr perty in her estate and thus any decedent purporting to convey the property would not have
obtain d the property in question. Further, there is no evidence the property was in the estate of Francis
Wood rd at the time of her death.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court determines there are no genuine issues of material fact
which

revent the granting of summary judgment and that under the Jaw Amy S. Paul is entitled to

Judgm nt. Therefore, Amy S. Paul's Motion for Summary Judgment, is respectfully, GRANTED.
DATED this 29th day ofJanuary, 2016.
BYTHECOU
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed/emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
~

Decisi n, to the following, this 29th day of January, 2016:
Vince t C, Rampton
Attom y for Plaintiff
170 S. ain •Street, Suite 1500
Salt L e City, Utah 84101
vram t n ·oneswaldo.com
Matthe M. Boley
Adam . Reiser
Attom ys for Defendants
111 E. roadway, Eleventh Floor
Salt La e City, Utah 84111
mmb khlaw ers.com
ahr
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B1,: Piald B\U.'voy, a1twat,ed 1n fl"1t-Lake Oountf, State or Uta.h.

.
&\ll. taxea ar \91\ataoaver nat.ul'O ~Clh a~

sub~oot. 1howvor, to

.

111'):41~ G8a.in11t.

11a1d 11POp8L't)' &ncl oonotit,ut.o a U.en.

'fi'it.111 "• the, bcln:t..,gt sclicf iO."«ntoH, .thia !l'ftont.y Kightb oy· of .Je1n1.1a.">'• A. D. 1911,
,i

S1gno4 1n t.'na l'L'Gf(IDQQ or

ooll\1 ll~1Jcao ,
daoo11aod..

St11to

arr 1\lbUo.
tlGII

I

I

l11on

225-6. l,i6,,I....-

ct Utat1,

N. Burt

lilU.~ah.8 Bw.,t,

)
)011.

oomi.t)' Of Sal. t t.6ke )

8 -..dnintllVllti'

sne4 &114 ezi,out

Bltllll01'

Wa.ltoa ltOIIIMf

,I

I

On t.bo twenC..J S1ght,b d!LY or JAnuat-1 A. D. 1911 poiootl_Al.lt oi,..,aarod botal"t ao Blee.nor :lL., ff 8\.ll't, &
Bl.iJob .8. Bu1:1, Huobcu1d tbe slgnol'e

ot t.bO llitlWI 1nat.rW1Lant., tiho dtlly aoknowlffdRGd t.o ·rae th•t. r.he.v

extout.eca t.he a&.t1.e,

wen.ta" Rormo1
Not.11L"y

ao

naool'd.ed a.t t.l\o Hfl\lGlrt. of ,rt-,11.or t,oim°"'lruot
I.bat.noted. 1n

11

s-,," p11go ~•

Uno tzl•

Publ101

Jan }l. 1911 Gt 9:ltl A II, 1n •7~y• or Deod.a pll.lJa: 2Z]\."

Raoording feo paid 7CJJI.

(81Bnod) F. J. At JaqUoa, Rooo1del', Salt Ll&lca Co@t,, UtQb 1 b;v R, Ii
••:.":..: i:.•-~:--,. ......::::-4::•::z:::cr-•~·=n,.i:.T.·
•·-••-r-.•wzo--,.t.- ·•v:.."1••
1'ff'C. .. ·•·:.•11-0:.&:1,

Dollot.t 1

Do~ut.v,

::.i\.o-.1. ••L..- .....

·.:..-:.=..::::.-.:-..r--=.=:.-•· • • •

1/276172

~ke • Btata of'

In tlle Dlotioi'at Ot>Ul"\ of t.be 41'l11l-d Jud1111Al D1a\&'10t. 1n a.rid to• B11.lt 1'ake Oowiti-, ~h-

, ot lAnd in Ral

ORDER 8E'i'TLI\m li'IHAu A<- :,OUHT AND DI6TRX.BU'fIH!I
) OOl'flOl!'

Of Reo-

MJ\"MB.

1 Wo11i tbU't.oon,

Ind ono-balt

t'i-a111t

nt}"'"t.hl"eo And on

~ d.q

diav111Ut1on 01 t,ba oota.te in hi• ll4Ma
01' Je&m&Mft 1911, 1'0~16.llly

bav11 aoo11i-:iboo l

~

11~

d. Jll"•ntooa; u.1110

)

•nis '1.00 MYll\6 ox11a1no4 t,bO

t,Q

t;O

the pul'aon.u ~M;t.lGd tbsrott1, com.i,a on thh .28\h

bona~ 'botCl'O tho OGUtot, &rid t.be Ocut-t h4vill6 board. tba toau-

ottortd. iii. ouppori or GGS4 pot1'\1Gn1 and hAttnii aixlllaino4 tbo l,IL'00l't

or

not1oo

,ei,or, ot tbe: robuo llppoU!:ted by thlo tJcnu-t to

ot tbie heu1111,·

cwdlt

~uJ.11 lldviaect

o•id aooount,

:lb the 11r01dao,,

-~

ba'lina: oorud,doi-1d 11uah tootimon,1 pool• ond 1'0J1avt, and. buS.na
.
.

•,;

,tat.. 11.uo uicf. l•sal. aoUM or t.'bio huut1:3 on a&W pet1Uo~ and aaa~\lnt. bA, beon sfHon.•.

-~ 6tld.

.

~"'now tincnu• .
..;.
.

. that,
.■-14ti
••

·

JIUl,V

JUdS• clt.ed on. Nova11bQ

·

s,11, 19091 ·•S:•c;I 68 ~,•l'•I· tut, ab•
;

•

•

• • :.·

'KS

tbh a. H•!4M
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•

•

~,!

•
Stolt, ta.k• Count:,,, Ut~h, •11<1 tort i,ool "!14 peraonol votot • in ••ld Count:,,.

,h•t upon poii\ion 1m1·

1.n•P due not1o~ And Moring s111d J, Fr~nk Judgo '!!&o 11ppo1nt.od tho /ulmin1otrator of

.

,11lcl dooe&ood by ordor dul:,, given ond tl&d• l>oroln on D10011bov , vc1, ll)09.

•

tbo 11ota._to

.

ot

!!!Uot ea.1d J, Pu~ J"'1!:•

tborutt•• dul:,, qU&llr1•d a.nd leUora or .ad.:;1n1otrAt1on wore duly 1oouod to him,

1.e

t

ouoh Mminlot•<>-

tor, and that ht h&• ovor oinoe boon and •tUl le tho JJl.tsiniotrator ot a aid ••tato,

That

I

ao SUOh

I

i

I

Ad"1n1atrator ha of>Ullod. dll• And logal notioo to be uJ.nn to the oredi.t.ore ot s<>id dOooooed an:! &ll

n1l

po.. on, Mv1ns ·•l.o.1"• 0110.mot tha oet&U ot »aid dooeaoed 1 41\d thAt dooroo hl>O boon dul)' ·•ntor&d 11

fllod noro1n ~d,iwlioatiag tliat_ duo and 1.og&l 11ot10.- to euoh ol&inanto Gnd arodl taro h<lo boon given,
. <>114 t.ll•t u,o u:oa •Uowo<l b:,, low aQ:l oaid n<>tioe foe orodi tol'I or aald d••••••d. and poooono ll•ving
1.,

t'.

oldrn •K"1ns t nor utate to vooeont tho1r ola1me llaa expired,

.,.
II

I

Ill

Bl

1•

l

d:

,

I·

01

Tut e•1d •, Frank .Jlldge, ae auoh

~- 4'):rtnhtrator, 4J.oo ao,uod oll tho oet.,te or "'1111 d•• ... ••d to bo dilly inventor1•d and apl4'aiaod, aru!·

-

~

j
1

'

• ,,, BUJ>ll l nvontor:,, a~ .r>pr&iatroont hn, been ctuly f11ed )loreln,

~
~,

~ hh

•

~\&t tho fln,,l aooount ot the "'1nln1otro.Uon '!f
oaid ut11t>t b:,, oald Mlo1nlatratar, filed with
'.1

•ald potttl.on tino1n 1 oorrootl)' ond 001Uplotol;'. ohoWJt ol.l tbo o,to.to of said deoeu9d 1 togottter

t

-~ 1i0 hie bond• aa ouoh Ad1dn1otrator; 01>1 oJ.oo oorreotll/ onc1 ao11pl•t•1Y ~nows ,uoh itoroa IUld 0111¥ auo
~

1

!

~ t:161.d aooount pro1,1o r vouefloN!I

l"

•

a.llo.l

ocivol'1.l\'.t ull ouob itanu p&1d autt u\11 \]Wt, li6'1d. r'itutil aoooun\. oorl'eotlyj
i'.
ocupletoly notn rorth and aoooriboo oll tho· oo~oto
of oa1d dooeasoci, roal, p ..•onol and l'lhod 1 Ii

--~

'

I

~ no-. in tlll )land.a or uid. Ad.m1n1ot.r"tor tor Q1otrib~tlon unto th• p•l'••n• ontitlo<I tl!oroto.

·1

I
I

Ind

~-t.bo fflll\U\t or th• ••t•t• at ito 6w1•ahed val.ueJ and said Adl:l1n1otrator Ila• i'Uod bore1n with his

\

th•:o ••• no trror• or o::a1eo1ono in sGid r111a.J. o.ooount

aM

,

I

'1hlt

no orod.ito ola11Qod tl1oro111 whioh Will re-:

fault to tho <11oMl.va.nt4go ot An:( poroon 1Morallted 111 said eototo, and tl\Ot said f inol Aooount h

ruu 1 truo and c,or,oot

1n all p1!'tloularo e.114 ).>l'ope~ to b• ••~tUd 4nd. •llowad ao proeontod,

I

~t. 61.1 01&l1:LU esa1nat, t ml.ot•t• ot oaid doooaoad ~hioh miu proeonted to e•id Adminiotntor I

I

-~ ~U•t,

a nd all debt.a, eq,enuee and ..i,,u,sos ot tllo odm1n1etrat1on
011<1 dhoh■l'god in rull,
tl\ll

~ ao1d oototo, have boon paid, a&t1at1od

real ootato belonQing to odd oat.ate have boon· Cull¥ poid, eotiofied a.nd dioobargsd., 1nolW11ng \

'rh6t undsr an! J.M'•ui>nt to tne

dl.J!ooUon and p,ov1o1ono or • oortoin ardor •1¥1 Ju~ISJ'•nt. of thio Orurt roopeot1ag pa!'ff,ont of ounh

1

I

1nbor1tanoo tu, 0J1de in tho .,,.tter or eoid aetate 'on J&~ary 20th, l9J.l, oAid J, frank .Jud.go, • •

•

Adlltni1trator, baa poid. t o David l{attaon, Bt&to Treaaarer of Utah,

t2 163J..7a,

Ol'd.(lr

I

N!n•• Julltl• Dl>ld,,rin, 11:atnoeyn JUdao •nd J, Prank JUds• lwn poid to
•f

h•~lhnat ta• payoblo by thot1 in thO propootlotto
. aapitAl. Dt.ook

ar n,

I

l>,

.

'

.·,
· 1u• ~04b

by oca.ld· r1vo ).4atl,f ~

i porto•IQ.ld

~·,-·:.: _\.

and

~~ ii,o

I

full amount or tho in-

!

•toak .ob~ t.1N.oa.too ror 20,.000 utmroe ooah,

. an:1 ••oh· writtRn 1n t.he> na.wa or Olli ,or oa.id r1vo~~e1onu laotlr flATJGd, on.u ooL"tit'io01.u ror

: •·bt-roa act.eh 111 t,ho , IIUIO ot oie.qh or au,1d po:i,ttona.

I

aold st.a.to·

ono-tifth oaoh1 U)Jon tho lOO,OOOahlU'oo or t ile

br/ 1ve

J\ldgO D01n91U1Y, ropreeontud

I

&M Ju<igKleht, Rl lMbet,h ,. O'Brien, PZ'MOGIS

'l'rHoureo $29 14ll,77, boing the ,um fl.~•11 by euoh ~rd•r
a.nd ~udgm•n't. •• t
,

•

botns tho oWI f11Cod by!

•o.ld o,dor and. Judgcont •• tho fulL °"'ount or tt,o inhorib&noe t.ax 1.oynble ui-on tbo eetat.. of ,aid
. dCIOO&eoct1 4n:i thAt, \U\d.Or u.ml purout:\.!lt. to auab

Jud11• Yoodwud.,

•

i

'!!hat ol.l tnoo what•oevor _1"11"1.4' lovied UJ!on 'th> l'•••onol. provorty or upon!

th• inM»1t1'noe hx 1r.ipoo•l1 by 141< on oatawo of <10001uod. poroono,

20,ooo

fha.t ~aia o~der 4nd Jud"1'ont, of J1omiury 2:0tb., 19

od pat'aona •nd. by aa.1d 44::11.ntatttatio~ ~•opoottvoir tully c,a .rviod out,

ooupUod with,
101•

&~

only '!lair• at ,1411' of

I
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cl

.l

~ nth all thO 1nor.-uo tl\Oroot and 111001>0 •nd profit• tbarofro,., 1noluding a.ll oaah ann••, tiv.t 001110

'l it•"" "• h• paid out of tho ootAto of oold doooaaed on "ooount or th<! a.dJ111nletrot1on thor•ot'

I>

nfl ·
2t:.n•

I

•lld

Qt

l(ary ~ o Bald!Jlt>,

u(lga

P'l'llDOH H.

Lotr1r

•ob

:,ri..t o&td doaeaeo d loft na huob•rul1 t atllor

I

1,tlii

l v1tn,
11ng

I
I
I

IOh

I

l, • ,

ihol'
l""'O

, av.oh

I
1:

.,'

(·

•

laeUy

by tM

.j

rinal aooaunt or oaid .t,d1J1niotr&tor •foreoaid to bo in hie h•ndo ao Ad:niniotra.tor thr

c11otribut1on to tba poroone ontitlod tboroto I and "111<1 all othor 01t•h lott bf d•••••~d not now kn

hOP

11n unclLvidOd one-ritt.h or ouoh oatoto in tho lulndo or ool d Acln1n1otrotor I and oll ootAto lert by

daoon1i1ed not now k.n.O,m

n

01'

diaoovoro<t.

io Unrefore Ordnod 1 tllat odd ardor ond JUds:u,nt. ond tho 11tn <>roted bf H lc1 qrdor

•r4

I

judgciont r.odo by thu Court horo1n on Januory 20th1 l9U 1 bo • l'ld t ho aoi,e to be roby dool>rod to be

l

rully p.,.id 1 ••t1or1od IUld dieolUll'gOd,

ln4

Partbo» Ordorod 1 tb&t tbo rtool oooount or so.id Adl:11n1otrotor bO · And bbe

app,,ovad

••ot]¥1

r iYI

or diuooverod; and each Of es.id f1VO poroons luUy n1und io • onb:.tl·od to h•VO diotributod \lllto i,i.., or

!

Ila

o, coth•r aurvivl.ns hor, and t®t n!d

nacOd poroana are ,aolel.}' ontitlad ta hove cliltr11>utod -unto thee, hore1n oU the oatato or add· d•oo•

· shalm

~

Ith

IU1Q

a n::10

1o here\cy oetU~d,

o.Uowod GO preuntod,

ll'1trtl\ar Ordored 1 that tho oot..O or doooa aad thown by ea1d rinol aooount to be in Uw bond• ot

1:

uoid Adtolniltrlltar t0l" c11atribuUon to tho .,.,,,on• •1tti tled thoroto, •nd •l.l eatato lort bf <1••••011d,

111d1

i,aal, 'l'•roonal and ~•t11 not now knom or diuoov•rod 1 bo olld tbo oa,,o ls ltoroby diotubutod. and

iI

.t:

'ffoodnrd,

1t•thllr:;n 'r, Judgo, ond

i

au
Id

apart unto BJ.1....both Jr, O' Br1on, lfary .A,Jnaa B0ld,1t11 Jlranooe H. Y!00dl<Ard, Kothll:')'D 'I', Judg•

.1 r ... :

.•

Pra.nlt .Judge, t.he ohl ldren or ■ aid <1••••••d,

&lld

11t

ar4 J .

the oole a nd only hair• or oa id uoooosod aw,n.ving

bar, 1n oqu&l tl!Aroe 1 ol\Are wid ollaro 4l.1ko; &n4 that upon th• t1l1na heroin by ~d .l.dml.n~otrato~

iDd.•

i

or tl\a roao1pt or roaeipta of ea.id. 41atr1butoo6 tor th.air diatributive ohare11 .of' ea.id oata.to iu~id•

1or,

J

,r1oc1

l

Adminiotr•t.ol' be d1•o'h.aitgod o.nd t.ho aureU .e11 upon bill 'bond a.a auoh Adm1nlotiriator- •xonorutod troa &11

liability too hh Tutw!o aota •• euall Adm.lniotutor,

• upoo.j
11<11!

1

~I

~

oooount or odd /ldl01n1otrlltor o.nd upoa1f!o~I1y c11otr1- ·

butod bDreby 18 a1tuatocl in Solt 1'.Joke Dounty1 St&te o~ lltoh1 •ltd pftrt1oul arl.}' doooriboti •• roUowoi'Pba II

i

Et ll

¼•ncl

t ho woat 96 roua of tho e

-Ir

e Q

bu..Ud.1ca■ G.n.:1

'

Ono V.., ato;,y, 1-4--z'oom, oobbl.O11to.n1 h0u11;

One loo hi>uoo;
rwo pwop houaoa;

,.i

.

on.a
·ono
0"4
• OIIO
Ol>O

1mAll. t'ratte sar11go;
1- atwy 1 4- room r ,...,.. lu>uotl

t.-uo b..-i, and hAy houo01
Ohiol,011, ooop1
l-ohry1 4- rooto odobo hou••I

~o lllilk

·

hou■••I

Ont 2-1'0011 log oab1nl
.uid all tenou ,

.Uao tit• ,nut. 76a root or lot 1 1 In blook 4 1 plat

JO

out,

ti,,m.oll1p I? aouth·, or rerls• l

improTe:ie.nt.1 thor ol.apon aitua.to, io-:-w1t, ..

o..., \l&l' :i1rn1

• l9

¾ot StoUon 151

Hat or .tl!t. Bait Wk• x,oi,1c11.an, in salt Loko oouniy1 Ute.hi togot)lor "1th thQ tallowing -c!Dooribod

11111

d

!11\Al

Tho rool .oototo doear1bod ln ooid
I_

.. ; I
I

tlla

:::

•

lll1156~ath P, O' Brton,

lot 2 1n ia1<1 llloot 4 auor1bcd u

·?', BAU L•k• Oit y survoy1 •n4 that port ct

ooconolns •t the •outboact oorno~ or 1111d lot 2 &JUI runn lng the

0

· no~th J..65" 'to otJ tb•no• woat ll2Q toatl thonoo routb
f'ooti t~no• M ot Qi: fo•tll tlhtno• uouth 11!5:f teat,

.

ins&

.

.

.

'7/r tHtJ
&nd.

toao~r with t h• toll?rtng d Ho•lbed 'bull4l11(1
-~

thonoo i,oot Ill!([ to8~l \honoo •Outb 12

't.bonao ta•t 1.00 toot to the pl&o• or· boa l ~
(

•¥

.

!llp~ovomont, thoroup~t•,

.

.

·

~..-wur-

l,11...,00'f,- .-,Diolt And aton■ Hoidonao;
1 ...

,:-J-.:

00900
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one brlok et.oblo """

,!GrCl(!Ol

OM rutiu ohtol<tn ooop 1 "'1li
on• _tuat o..nlogo obodf bolnB altu•to in 8Al t Leko 011';(1 w~jeot to,. riaht or

•

""Y

tor uoo 1n

I

0 OCJllOn by 1.no ownore or ulcl lqotly dosorlbod parool of ground <>lid by \h& own••• ot th1t t>••t or

utd lot 2 d.. .oribod

••=•nolng

GI

-t

a. point

127/r r oob n orth or tho aoutlmoet ~arna r or .. Id lot 21

I
I

82/i

and running thonoo n et

i2J!r

toot; no rth "57/r roatf west

root, llr><I • outh J 7/r roo t 1 upon, ovo, •txl

ao?" oo• • et.rip ·0 r ground 12 ta&t, wJ.do ttnd 8~ f e ot l on1:r, itunn1ng 01.uterly on:::t ue,tet'ty, Along t.M

north8Ml!>oet aid• or tho t1retly obovo doaolrb•d vuool,

•

Dono In op•n Owrt Jonu•ry 2£1U1 1 l9ll,
lly tho Oou,tl-

'I'. D.' LEl'IIB 1
Jud~•,

M'l'EDT 1
Unrg...,ot Zane 1(1.tohor Olork,
By 1,. P, Pol.nor! I>evuly (l].ork,
( 8'.!:i\L
~ndoUOd.1 !lo, 584-3

l)htrlo t Oourt, 'l'hlrd J udio!Cll D!etr lot, st.ate of Utah1 county or Solt LAk• .

lll tna ltatter o r 1.M Beto.to or 11. .y Judgo 1 Dooooaad,

l'U.Od In the Clark ' • Oft'1oa Bolt Lok• Oo\Olty,

Utllh1 Jan~ 1911 ll<>ogortt Zano WHoll"1', Ollrk :!ld D1ot. °?urt, lly
8tat• of Ut oh 1

)

County or B•lt l,&l<o,

)

I

P. Plll~or llOputy Olm,l<.

J:,,

)oo .

1 1 l!a.,goret Z•n• ll1toh0•, Clerk or tho'Miird ~ud1ol <1l 1)1.otriot Oourt of t ho Sta.ta or Ut.<.h, in
<>M ror 361.t Lalco counti, 1 do horoby •~•tlty thot th• ror•going- ie • rull, truo on<1 ocrroot oopy or
tile ••1g1"'1l ll;'d or Settling 111ml .looount Alld Dl.atr1but1ng &atato,

tb.e i ot&.t o or ~Y Jud.Be , 000,a.ud, ao "PPOar• ot ro oore1 nnd

'l'ltneu
" ·

l),

-,,y

ruo

No. 564:3,
1.n

cy

In 'l'ha llatta1• or

ortioo.

bond •nd Shl of oold Court , a t Bo.lt t.oko 01ty, this twont:,--elghth d<>Y or Januory 1

19:;.1,
ll•rR•••t zone Witohor, Olorli .

Br

1,,

P, Palno• 110.1,uty OJ.orlc ,

R•oord•d 1>t roque,rt, ot llrodlay P1001\el & Horkno.. Pob l 1911 at )5106 P, I!, 1n •7-y• or llooda
JIGS•• 227--:,0,

Abatraotoc\ in •1>-1 1• p•S• 218 1 11nol.r •0-5,~ P•B• 11! 1 llne 4,

R•oo•11ing tea pa!dil:l,

,a.1unae1) P. J, A. J~~u•a , R•aordor, Salt Lo.kt County, Utah, by Mr.ry o. Bi:ait,h , Poputy,

J'or

•

"-M

1n nonl'll.rtorotian ot tl\o

11uu.

or One DollAr, raoH11,,\. WhoraQt ie, hereby ao\:.nol'l'lOdMed, wo

\incttthy , e 11t ""fl1.ttn , 1.r-.nerur 111\:l ut. over

t.p

1-ho Ueroh nnt1 U&nk: 1 G oorvara.t1on, a.ll tht1 hoo.>c a.coo

.J,t..

ao oho'lffl hy 'tit1 •l bnnk, or t ho Ut.uh t,lme 0011'1}'&.ny uudth" cto.t.t o r ~ l, l9ll., ~•

l'lill'

aohed.Ult at-

t.liohe1d, horotn nnd Pllldo 4 pts.l't huroor •

•

00901

j•

•

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00902 t-7' '-I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

....
. I

. ·- ·.

I

..,

. .

-~.

. ·,. _.: :·~~ ·'\•

I

.-

i

. ... ,...

;

J

•.•

~-

. ·,· ·

·.·!,-,.. ....

.• ... -.... . , .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

•

•
~( .
.........

·.. __ .-··1 .

- ___ ,..,,,,

I

i

(!it{ '.
---~'C\'' .·.

~-,_(:_ -

I

.-r---_J

r

~~It/,.;,_

,fr,. ,

.\

.

,.,

.

:· .....

;

(.

• i-y~\:ir_;-:·

~if·'·'·

:1;~~){::
H(l:J!f::--·

1

•ltitl( I~--+--'!---- ----1;' • . ··: ••

·.

:t

;
~

"if
~-/_J~~~~·: . .

. .~rv- (
t

••

·;:

\II,II
;:::::===~---

i:

. 'J'

. .:.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

...-

•

.-

..,:

'

•I

~

•

-

.. ~~ - ... ·. :··

·.- ",NO ·:

.

.

J

,v....,, • "\'"-,

'/,:•:•.

· · ·: _.~:..::. ·~;?·; ·:;' ~-i~k ·.._.· ':·. :.':.'i ~ll.Jig:•;,;;._ .·· ·_..::;:.:
.-'~:;•;•,:.-! , '••,,: :•.•~~J~,:~:-:~• :'t:• ~ ,••~•'•./..;: \•,:•~••
,

, .•

,

,. ,1

• ,.'. , ,

• ,"'

.-

•

·1:

.:

I

o

•t

: - : :~ •

..... . ·' . . I

i l l ~ ... ...

I

I
i
J..
I

I·
I· .

,. . ' ·>'"~'F!°!jLi,~ifq4i!C-~-~~;,i~ .•_.·. ;~-

...
'.:

'

~:. ·. ~-.

-

',:
. .,

'-~ - ~ ~ I

•

•

•

~;__~~;,/ ~~~~~~ . .
•

•

di~/<: '

• "

,•

.. ··:. '

•

. tu~.-~ tf&e~-~-who
ur.. ~ ~ . ~thtamt. .· -~· .. : ~.

t-:'. -'~ .:~-- . . . - .

r .

, .

:- . •

i

I..

......- .,·

I

!
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

... ·f- --· ~- '-------------t~]

·---,-/

I

r
I

7

I

L

L__,

j

l

L__
l

1

:.-

0
~
~

co

01

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

000"

S.+

Exhibit B

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

... -··....., ... .

r·

, ..

,.

.•..
·,

..

'.•' .
:

f•:::'
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.·

....

